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To Speak or Not to Speak, That Is Your 
Right: Janus v. AFSCME 
David F. Forte* 
Some Supreme Court precedents go through extensive death 
spasms before being interred. Lochner v. New York,1 Plessy v. Ferguson,2 
and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce3 come to mind.4 Others
like Chisholm v. Georgia5 and Minersville School District v. Gobitis6 in-
curred a swift and summary execution. Still others, overtaken by 
subsequent cases, remain wraith-like presences among the Court’s 
past acts: Beauharnais v. Illinois7 and Buck v. Bell8, for example, remain 
“on the books.” 
I. Abood 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education9 falls into the first category. 
Over what turned out to be a prescient objection by Justice Lewis 
Powell—“Collective bargaining in the public sector is ‘political’ in 
any meaningful sense of the word”10—the majority in Abood held
* Professor of law, Cleveland State University. 
1 198 U.S. 45 (1905), effectively overturned by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). 
2 163 U.S. 537 (1896), effectively, though not explicitly, overruled by Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 US 483 (1954). 
3 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
4 One might say that, with the Civil War, the death spasms of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
60 U.S. 393 (1857), were quite literal. The case was superseded by U.S. Const.
amend. XIII (1866) and amend. XIV (1868). 
5 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded, U.S. Const. amend. XI (1795). 
6 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943). 
7 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
8 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
9 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
10 Id. at 257 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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that a union of public employees is no different from a union of pri-
vate employees in its right to collect “agency fees” from nonunion 
members of the bargaining unit that the union represents. Acting 
as an “agent” of the nonunionized workers, the union could justifi-
ably collect fees for the collective bargaining and dispute resolution 
services it provided to the nonunion employees.
Abood was originally seen as an advance in First Amendment free-
doms. First Amendment casebooks seemed to categorize the case in 
that way.11 The Court held that public employees could not have their 
union dues or nonunion agency fees used for political or ideologi-
cal purposes. Thus, union assessments on workers fell into two cat-
egories: chargeable fees for services that the union provides, and 
nonchargeable fees subsidizing a union’s political activities, such as 
some forms of lobbying or electioneering (to the extent constitution-
ally permitted).
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees12 put an end to Abood and its distinction between a
union’s collective bargaining with a public employer and a union’s
political activity. Justice Powell’s common-sense observation that
everything that a union and a public employer agree upon is a po-
litical decision became the basis for the holding. Following recent
Supreme Court First Amendment doctrine, the decision is based
on the notion, as in Citizens United v. FEC,13 that money talks and
the Constitution protects that kind of talk. Along with National
Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becarra, decided this term,
Janus continues to cast protections around citizens who object to
being compelled by state action to speak out against their beliefs.
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, also de-
cided this term, sidestepped the issue in favor of deciding the
case on religious discrimination grounds, but Janus will certainly
have salience when that issue returns to the courts. Money as
speech, public-union contracts as political decisions, and the pro-
hibition on compelled speech are the three legs on which Janus
stands. 
11 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, First Amendment Law 494–95 
(6th ed. 2016). 
12 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
13 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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II. Abood’s Confused Legacy 
To the majority in Janus, Abood’s legacy was wasteful and ambigu-
ous. To the dissent, Abood was an “embedded” precedent upon which 
much law had been built. Following the Abood decision, the issues 
that bedeviled the courts included (1) whether public-sector unions 
had to ask permission from their members to spend a percentage of 
their dues on political activities, or whether it was up to the worker 
to find out the percentage so spent and ask for a refund or for it not 
to be withheld; and (2) how to determine the line between charge-
able and nonchargeable expenses for calculating the agency fee for 
nonunion workers. 
For example, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association,14 the Court had 
to weave through a number of disputed charges on nonunion work-
ers and decide on which side of the line the following charges fell: 
activities of the union’s state and national affiliates, outside litiga-
tion, public relations expenditures, and expenses for carrying on an 
illegal strike. In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Employees,15 the Court 
confronted differentiating expenses related to conventions, social 
activities, litigation, organizing, publishing, and death benefits. In 
Locke v. Karass,16 the Court approved a fee to nonunion members for 
the cost of litigation undertaken by the national union. In Chicago
Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson,17 the Supreme Court disap-
proved the idea of rebates for improper assessments, because the 
funds taken from the nonunion workers had already been improp-
erly utilized. In that case, the Court did require unions to provide 
sufficient notice to union and nonunion members for assessments 
that were earmarked for political purposes. But the Court failed 
to address the “opt out” problem, which still left the onus on the 
worker to initiate his claim not to have a portion of his fees taken. 
In response, the state of Washington required a union to gain prior 
permission from nonunion members before assessing any fees for 
political purposes, a law that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld.18 
14 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
 
15 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
 
16 555 U.S. 207 (2009).
 
17 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
 
18 Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
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The Supreme Court’s taxonomical quest was just the tip of the 
iceberg. There were hundreds of lower court decisions attempting 
to parse out Abood’s imprecise formula, and the Court considered 
some when it finally questioned the basis of Abood. In particular, 
the Court recognized the nearly insurmountable obstacles facing a 
nonunion worker who sought a refund of his improperly charged 
agency fees.19 
III. The Ticking Clock 
By 2012, the Court began signaling that Abood’s characterization
of agency fees as collective bargaining service payments was mis-
taken. In Knox v. SIEU, Local 1000,20 Justice Samuel Alito declared 
for the Court, “Because a public-sector union takes many positions 
during collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic 
consequences, the compulsory fees constitute a form of compelled 
speech and association that imposes a ‘significant impingement on 
First Amendment rights.’”21 Two years later, in Harris v. Quinn,22 the
Court declared that persons who were not “full-fledged employees” 
of the state could not be assessed union imposed fees simply because 
they worked in a state-run program. In his opinion for the Court, 
Alito engaged in an extended critique of Abood, declaring that it paid 
insufficient attention to First Amendment concerns in the imposi-
tion of agency fees. He also expounded on the long list of cases at-
tempting to deal with the chargeable/nonchargeable distinction and 
described the heavy burden on nonunion employees who sought to 
obtain their right not to contribute to causes they did not believe in.
But for the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, it is virtually cer-
tain that Abood would have fallen in 2016 in Friedrichs v. California 
19 See Jibson v. Michigan Ed. Assn.-NEA, 30 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 1994); Price v. Int’l 
Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 927 F.2d 88 
(2d Cir. 1991); Andrews v. Educ. Assn. of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1987); Am. 
Fed. of TV & Recording Artists, Portland Local, 327 N.L.R.B. 474 (1999);  Calif. Knife & 
Saw Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995), all of which were cited by the Supreme Court in 
its attack on Abood in Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 2636–38 (2014). 
20 567 U.S. 298 (2012). 
21 Id. at 310–11 (citing Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Emp., 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984)) 
(holding that a union could not unilaterally increase fees for political purposes with-
out notice to the employee). 
22 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
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Teachers Association.23 In that case, public school teachers who had 
resigned their union membership protested paying any fees, citing 
their free-speech and associational rights under the First Amend-
ment. Their complaint was dismissed at the district court level, a 
decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarily 
affirmed.24 At oral argument before the Supreme Court, most ob-
servers noted Scalia’s hostile tone and expected a decision against 
Abood. With his passing, however, an evenly divided Court affirmed 
the Ninth Circuit per curiam. When Neil Gorsuch joined the Court 
in April 2017, Alito was at last able to drop the other shoe. With the 
predicted 5-4 vote in Janus, the Supreme Court overruled Abood. 
IV. Employment Speech or Political Speech? 
The central question separating the Court and the dissenters in 
Janus was whether compulsory agency fees constituted speech about 
the conditions of the workplace or instead was political speech deal-
ing with public issues. Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent centered on the 
Pickering test. She argued that because the speech in question was 
employment related, it did not matter if it also had political content. 
Thus, it was not a question of whether these fees were speech at all: 
The dissent did not contest the claim that personal financial expen-
diture can constitute political speech, and it accepted Abood’s rule 
that nonunion employees could not be compelled to contribute to 
political causes. Instead, Kagan simply emphasized throughout that 
the speech was workplace related.
The Pickering test, as developed in Pickering v. Board of Education,25 
Connick v. Myers,26 and Garcetti v. Cebellos,27 holds that an employee’s 
private speech about a matter of public concern is protected by the 
First Amendment unless the speech causes harm to the efficiency or 
harmonious operation of the workplace. However, if the employer 
has a reasonable belief that the speech will cause disruption, even 
23 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
24 Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13-676-JLS (CWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 188995 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013); aff’d 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24935 (9th Cir. Cal., 
Nov. 18, 2014). 
25 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
26 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
27 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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if the speech concerns a matter of public concern, the employee has 
no First Amendment protection. Kagan’s argument was straightfor-
ward. Because unions are legally bound to represent the interests of 
all members of the bargaining unit, the employer may wish to agree 
to agency fees for the sake of harmony in the workplace. Removing 
compulsory agency fees threatens the network of relations built up 
between employer and union to the detriment of a smoothly func-
tioning governmental enterprise.
Kagan cited Abood’s view that permitting compulsory agency 
fees would alleviate the possibility of “inter-union conflict,” for the 
Abood Court had feared that without compulsory union fees, work-
ers might split into rival unions. But for the Janus majority, the idea 
that agency fees were necessary to avoid workplace disruption was 
chimerical. As Alito countered, no such disruption had ever oc-
curred, either at the time of Abood or after. 
Justice Alito used the example of the federal postal union. Under 
federal law, “a union chosen by majority vote is designated as the 
exclusive representative of all the employees.”28 Yet no agency fees 
are allowed under federal law. How then is harmony disrupted?, the 
majority asked. Twenty-eight states forbid agency fees. This is not a 
question of “inter-union conflict,”29 as the dissent put it, for nobody 
disputes that a public employer can agree to a union’s exclusive rep-
resentation of the workers. 
Kagan then tried another line. She offered examples of employee
disruption that might happen under the majority’s holding. “Sup-
pose a government entity disciplines a group of (non-unionized) em-
ployees for agitating for a better health plan at inopportune times and
places.”30 Would they claim that they were engaging in protected po-
litical speech? Or, “suppose a public employer penalizes a group of
(non-unionized) teachers who protest merit pay in the school cafete-
ria.” But the dissent undercut the force of the example by positing the
disruptive circumstances of the protest itself. Alito easily disposed of
the objections: A letter written by an employee to management ask-
ing for increased merit pay could hardly be seen to cause harm to the
workplace, but a demonstration in the workplace could. He pointed
28 Janus v. AFSCME 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2466 (2018).
 
29 Id. at 2489.
 
30 Id. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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out that the facts of each case could show that the manner of protest
would be disruptive, and hence the “political” nature of the protest
would be outbalanced by the needs of the workplace.31 Compulsory
agency fees do not prevent workers from being impolite.
Kagan’s main argument was that the speech in question did 
not reach even the first step of the Pickering analysis: namely, that 
agency fees were about supporting the union’s position on work-
ing conditions, and not about matters of general public concern. 
“[E]veryone knows the difference between politicking and collective 
bargaining,”32 she wrote, so there was nothing to balance. For the 
majority, however, collective bargaining with a public employer is
politicking, and there is no way to lever them apart. It is a ques-
tion of scale. When an individual asks for a raise, that is a matter 
of private concern. But when a public-sector union of thousands of 
employees asks for raises for its members, the effect on public policy 
can be enormous. And that only increases when, for example, teach-
ers unions bargain over tenure, teacher assignments, descriptions of 
duties, and administrative arrangements.
Alito’s contrast between an individual and thousands of workers 
asking for a raise would have left him with a problem had he ended 
his analysis there, for it made the political nature of the speech de-
pendent on its quantitative impact. In fact, he quotes his own major-
ity opinion in Harris to that effect: “[I]t is impossible to argue that the 
level of . . . state spending for employee benefits . . . is not a matter 
of great concern.’”33 A quantitative test on whether a union’s activity 
affects public policy would require the courts to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether the First Amendment applied or not.
On the other hand, later, Justice Alito made the more qualitative 
argument that public worker employment arrangements are by 
nature political. Where Kagan declared tautologically, “[a]rguing 
about the terms of employment is still arguing about the terms of 
employment,”34 Alito noted that unions negotiate and “express 
31 Id. at 2477 (majority op.). 
32 Id. at 2498 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 2475 (majority op.) (citing Harris, supra note 22). 
34 Id. at 2497 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Perhaps Kagan was retaliating for Chief Justice 
John Roberts’ famous trope, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
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opinions” over far wider issues, such as minority rights, school 
assignments for children, affirmative action, evolution, healthcare, 
and educational policy. These are, of their nature, central concerns of 
the polity, not just the workplace. This kind of qualitative definition 
of political action would cover all public-union activities, without the 
need to measure the extent of the impact in any particular instance.
In this debate, Justice Alito clearly has the more accurate percep-
tion of what happens in public-union negotiations. “When a large 
number of employees speak through their union, the category of 
speech that is of public concern is greatly enlarged, and the category 
of speech that is of only private concern is substantially shrunk. 
By disputing this, the dissent denies the obvious.” From their own 
experience, most Americans would likely agree. 
V. Stare Decisis 
It seems that whenever the Court moves in a different direction— 
no matter what the direction—the dissenters call out, “stare decisis”!
And so, the stare decisis dance begins. The dissenters list the criteria 
for maintaining a precedent and argue that the majority has vio-
lated the criteria. The majority says that it has not really changed the 
law—it merely reinterpreted the issue (see, for example, the Casey
plurality’s handling of Roe v. Wade, and Scalia’s response35)—or that 
the criteria for maintaining the precedent no longer exist.
Justice Kagan vigorously defended the continuing validity of 
Abood on the ground of stare decisis. Even if a decision is wrong, she 
intoned, it does not justify jettisoning it if the norms of stare deci-
sis call for its retention. Above all, she concluded, the reliance factor 
compels adhering to Abood: It has stood for 40 years. Not only courts, 
but legislatures and private and public actors had all channeled their 
conduct in light of its principles. The Court “wreaks havoc” on these 
“entrenched” arrangements.
Overruling Abood, Kagan continued, will disrupt many states’ 
complex and interrelated labor law legislative schemes. Thousands 
of contracts with agency fee provisions will be changed (perhaps she 
could have rhetorically used the word “impaired”) and will have 
to be renegotiated in a legislative atmosphere of real uncertainty. 
35 Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853, 861, 871 (plurality), with 
id. at 882–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (1992). 
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Moreover, Janus affects contracts in key state service sectors such as 
police, health, and safety. Were Kagan an originalist, or even a judi-
cial traditionalist, she could have bolstered her arguments with the 
Framers’ understanding of the independent role of the states in so-
cial legislation, or the fact that these state-bound contracts were es-
sentially local and not national in character. One suspects that Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist might have taken that line of argument.
Alito’s response was methodical, but dismissive. Where Kagan 
cited numerous ways the Court had previously championed the im-
portance and necessity of stare decisis, Alito retorted with quotes at-
testing to its disposability. Precedents can be overcome if there are 
“strong reasons for doing so,” he wrote. “The doctrine ‘is at its weak-
est when we interpret the Constitution.’” And it has “least force of all 
to decisions that wrongly denied First Amendment rights.”36 
Alito then listed the factors that permitted an overruling and 
found them easily applicable to Abood: its reasoning was poor, the 
rule it created was unworkable, it was inconsistent with decisions 
in the allied field, and subsequent developments had made it irrele-
vant. Alito saved for last the factor that Kagan had most relied upon: 
reliance. 
In the most detailed part of his analysis, Alito critiqued Abood’s
reasoning, focusing on the manner in which Abood wrongly read
two precedents that it had relied upon.37 Abood used deferential
scrutiny in a case replete with admitted free-speech interests, and
consequently, it did not accurately evaluate the strength (or weak-
ness) of the government’s interests in allowing compulsory agency
fees. The Court in Abood presumed but did not investigate whether
agency fees did in fact contribute to labor peace. Nor did it recog-
nize the differences in the effect that agency fees in the private
sector had compared to the public sector. It thus failed to acknowl-
edge how collective bargaining in the public sector had political
ends. Lastly, it was blind to the administrative problems that would
arise in distinguishing between chargeable and nonchargeable
expenditures. 
36 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2476.
 
37 The precedents were R.R. Employees v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), and Machinists 

v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
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Moreover, the rule announced in Abood was unworkable, Alito 
averred. He did not repeat the extensive history of line-drawing 
difficulties that he had made in Harris v. Quinn, satisfying himself 
with a brief summary. But he did emphasize the difficulties that non-
union members would face in having their claims for their agency 
fees determined and adjudicated.
Subsequent developments had eroded the credibility of the Abood
decision, he continued, stating again that exclusive representation 
was not tied to the institution of agency fees, and hence, labor peace 
was not threatened. Abood was dated. It was decided just when 
public-sector unions were beginning to expand and few saw how 
they would drive state expenditures.
Abood was also inconsistent with Court precedents dealing with
political action by government employees. While the Court has
protected government workers from being forced to support a par-
ticular political party, Abood permits the forced subsidy of political
action (i.e., collective bargaining with governmental agencies) by
the same governmental employees. Finally, Alito turned to reliance
interests. 
Here his position was far less potent, which, of course, is why he 
put the stronger arguments first. He dismissed the effect that over-
ruling would have on extant union contracts containing agency fees. 
They were of short duration, and anyway, such contracts usually 
severed provisions dealing with agency fees. He tried a distract-
ing rhetorical flourish: “[I]t would be unconscionable to permit free 
speech rights to be abridged in perpetuity in order to preserve con-
tract provisions that will expire on their own in a few years’ time.”38 
Besides, he said problematically, unions were on notice since 2012 
that the Court had doubts about Abood. 
Kagan pounced. She proclaimed the Court’s arguments on stare de-
cisis “the worst part” of the opinion. The majority, ignoring 40 years 
of settled law, embedded dicta into two previous cases (Knox and
Harris), ready to be used for the final coup de grace. “Relying on them 
is bootstrapping—and mocking stare decisis. Don’t like a decision? 
Just throw some gratuitous criticisms into a couple of opinions and a 
few years later point to them as ‘special justifications.’”39 
38 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485.
 
39 Id. at 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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There is a predictable irony in the battle over stare decisis. Begin-
ning in the late 1930s, the Supreme Court overturned decades of
precedents protecting contractual and other economic liberties. In
the 1960s and 1970s, the Court jettisoned precedents in many other
areas, such as criminal procedure, apportionment, and social tra-
ditions. In those cases, many justices in the minority bemoaned
the loss of respect for stare decisis. In recent years, however, where
there is a reversal of some of those judicial decisions, or when the
present Court strikes out in a new direction, the new minority
grieves over the loss of “long-standing precedent,” most of which
were born in those previously activist decades. Nor is the idea
of salting opinions with dicta for later use new. Justice William
Brennan famously used the technique.40 And so, the stare decisis
dance continues. 
VI. Compelled Speech 
We now return to the core arguments of the Court: money as
speech, public-union contracts as political decisions, and the
prohibition on compelled speech. The dissent did not contest
that money can be expression for First Amendment purposes,
nor could it. Whatever restrictions have been permitted by cam-
paign finance laws or judicial decisions since the time of Buckley v.
Valeo,41 the Supreme Court has made clear that money is not only
a means of expression, it is an indispensible element of political
expression: 
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group 
can spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting 
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, 
and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually 
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society 
requires the expenditure of money.42 
40 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, Brennan issued the following dictum, knowing that Roe v. 
Wade was soon to be decided: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.” 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
41 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
42 Id. at 19. 
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The second element that the majority needed to show was that
collective bargaining issues in the public sector were ineluctably
political. To do so, the majority had to demonstrate that the devel-
opment of public-sector unions had made their actions essentially
political in contrast to private-sector unions. Without recent his-
tory to back it up, the majority may have had a more difficult time
freeing itself from the grasp of Abood. And that is why the major-
ity’s reliance on recent history left an opening for the dissent to
claim that the Court was making up new law in defiance of stare
decisis. 
There is no doubt that public-sector unionization has had a major 
effect on the direction of public policy, particularly in education. 
In 1972, when Abood was decided, public-sector unionization had 
only begun its growth following the passage of collective bargain-
ing statutes by most states. Wisconsin had been the first in 1959. By 
2017, unionization was 34.4 percent public-sector workers, five times 
greater than in the private sector, in which only 6.5 percent were 
members of unions. States with a high percentage of public-sector 
workers, such as California (53 percent), New York (70 percent), and 
Illinois (52 percent), had granted them significant benefits, includ-
ing pensions, creating economic stress that has had major effects on 
their state budgets in other areas.43 
In Janus, Justice Alito noted that the “ascendance of public-sector
unions has been marked by a parallel increase in public spending.” In
constant 2017 dollars, state and local government spending had risen
from $4,000 per capita in 1970 to $10,238 per capita in 2014. He brought
up Illinois’ embarrassing underfunded pension obligations, spoke of
“multiple municipal bankruptcies,” and concluded that today, collec-
tive-bargaining issues have a high degree of “political valence.”44 
One might ask whether this constitutional doctrine is dependent 
on political and economic conditions that might vary from time to 
time? If public-sector unions’ influence on public spending drasti-
cally contracted, would the unions still be barred by the Constitution 
from obtaining agency fees, even though their “political valence” 
had become marginal? Is there an argument that even today, some 
43 See Daniel DiSalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, 5 Nat’l Aff. 3
(Fall 2010). 
44 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2483. 
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small public-sector unions do not have enough public-policy clout 
to be called political rather than economic actors? Are large teachers 
unions “in” but small parking enforcement unions “out” of consti-
tutional limitations here? Alito did distinguish between an individ-
ual’s complaint regarding pay, which would not rise to a matter of 
public interest under Pickering, and the same complaint by a union of 
many thousands. But where to draw the line? If Abood had problems 
in line-drawing, Janus may not be any better.
Elsewhere in his opinion, as noted above, Alito pointed to the 
other kinds of social and political issues that unions have become 
engaged with, issues that might stir the disagreement or even ire 
of many workers. They include issues such as climate change, the 
civil war, sexual orientation, and sexual identity. These are by nature 
political issues, where the size of the union matters not. If a union 
tries to argue that no agency fees are assessed for such position tak-
ing, the question reduces again to Abood’s unenforceable chargeable/ 
nonchargeable distinction.
On either count, then, Justice Alito is justifiably confident that the 
new doctrine of union public speech will stand. Either the union 
affects policies by its economic demands or, on noneconomic issues, 
it is impossible to make an accurate division between appropriate 
chargeable fees and nonchargeable fees.
On the third prong, compelled speech, the Court’s argument
is strongly persuasive. But it depends on the dissent’s reliance on
Pickering not being applicable, for under Pickering, not only may
employee speech be silenced or punished if it is disruptive to the
workplace—no matter what its “public” content—an employee
may legitimately be compelled to speak in putting forth the policy
of the government entity. But once Alito disposes of the Pickering
objection, the result cannot be gainsaid: state action that compels
a person to speak against his beliefs is patently contrary to the
notion of a republican government based on the consent of free
individuals. 
The facts of this case illustrate the majority’s position clearly. 
Illinois law permitted agency fee deductions from a worker’s pay 
without any form of consent. By doing so, the state violated the 
worker’s First Amendment rights, Alito emphatically declares, 
“unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay. By agreeing to 
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pay, nonmembers are waiving their First Amendment rights, and 
such a waiver cannot be presumed.”45 
In a tight argument, Alito calls on a run of precedents including,
among others, Wooley v. Maynard (“freedom of speech ‘includes both
the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking at all’”).46 
He quotes the famous pronouncement of Justice Robert Jackson in
West Virginia v. Barnette: “If there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein.”47 
Recall how pernicious forced affirmation can be. In 1860,
Abraham Lincoln, speaking to the people of New Haven, described
those positions of the North that alone would satisfy the South
of the North’s good faith: “[W]hat will convince them? This, and
this only; cease to call slavery wrong, and join them in calling it
right. And this must be done thoroughly—done in acts as well as
in words. Silence will not be tolerated—we must place ourselves
avowedly with them.”48 
In the most eloquent portion of his opinion, Justice Alito expressed 
the centrality of freedom of speech to the “search for truth” and “to 
our democratic form of government.” If state action compels people 
“to voice ideas with which they disagree, it undermines these very 
ends.” He warms to a point that will have salience when the next 
Masterpiece Cakeshop dispute reaches the Court: “When speech is 
compelled, however, additional damage is done. In that situation, in-
dividuals are coerced into betraying their convictions.”49 
In the face of Alito’s extensive arguments, Kagan’s only objection 
to the compelled speech doctrine was the tepid observation that it 
had not been often used by the Supreme Court. It is certain that the 
compelled speech doctrine has a future. 
45 Id. at 2486. 
46 Id. at 2463 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)). 
47 Id. (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
48 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at New Haven, Mar. 6, 1860, http://www.historyplace
.com/lincoln/haven.htm. 
49 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464. 
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VII. Level of Scrutiny 
Having established that collective bargaining in the public sector is a
form of political speech and hence is covered by the First Amendment,
one might expect that the Court would apply a strict scrutiny test to the
government’s attempt to limit that speech by the device of compulsory
agency fees. But Justice Alito takes a different route. In the preview
cases to Janus (Knox and Harris), Alito speculated on the appropriate test
that should be used. In Knox, he noted that the Court had previously
voided a federal compulsory contribution requirement for marketing
mushrooms that had been levied on a mushroom farmer and that such
schemes should be subject to “exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”50 
This was different both from strict scrutiny and from the traditional
Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech.
The formal strict scrutiny test demands that, for a statute that in-
fringes on a protected fundamental right to pass muster, the gov-
ernment must demonstrate that the end sought to be achieved is 
“compelling,” and that the means are “narrowly tailored” to achieve 
that end (a recent and somewhat more relaxed means/ends standard 
than the previous “least burdensome alternatives” test). In contrast, 
as set by the Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission (the “Central Hudson” test), governmental restrictions 
on commercial speech are tested by a form of intermediate scrutiny: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech 
to come within that provision it at least must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.51 
As restated in Janus, the new Knox formulation would be an amalgam 
of strict and intermediate scrutiny. The compelled agency fee must 
“serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through 
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”52 
50 567 U.S. 298, 310 (citing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001)).
 
51 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
 
52 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465.
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By ginning up the (formerly) intermediate scrutiny test closer to 
strict scrutiny, Alito paralleled Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s en-
hancement of the intermediate test on issues of sex discrimina-
tion: “Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action 
must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that 
action,”53 though Alito increased the ends component of the test he 
was using while Ginsburg strengthened the means component.
Previously in Harris, Alito had inserted a doubt whether even a 
strengthened intermediate scrutiny test was appropriate. After all, 
if agency fee “expression” is, in its nature, political speech, then 
only strict scrutiny would suffice. Yet, despite the unquestionable 
grounding of the decision on the premise that public union collec-
tive bargaining is political action, Alito did not take that final step in 
Janus and call for strict scrutiny. The Court finds “it unnecessary to 
decide the issue of strict scrutiny because the Illinois scheme cannot 
survive even under the more permissive standard applied in Knox
and Harris.”54 
Perhaps, Alito (along with the other four justices in the majority) 
was considering that collective bargaining in the public sector is 
both commercial and political and that it does not fit into either 
category entirely. If so, we should likely expect that the “Janus test”
will be yet another arcane intermediate scrutiny test that will take 
its place in First Amendment jurisprudence along with Time, Place, 
and Manner,55 the O’Brien test,56 and the Central Hudson test. 
VIII. Due Process 
As noted, Justice Alito found Abood wanting on every asserted 
ground. It was “poorly reasoned” and “inconsistent with other First 
Amendment cases,” there have been new developments since Abood
53 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
54 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. 
55 Restrictions on speech are constitutional if (1) they are content neutral (2) they 
are narrowly tailored to serve a governmental interest; and (3) they leave open ample 
alternative means of expression. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
56 Where expression has both verbal and nonverbal elements, the regulation at issue 
must (1) be within the constitutional power of the government to enact, (2) further an
important or substantial government interest, (3) ensure that interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of speech, and (4) prohibit no more speech than is essential to further 
that interest. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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was issued, and there were insufficient justifications for maintain-
ing the holding on the grounds of stare decisis. 
But throughout the opinion, Alito takes pains to emphasize the 
essential arbitrariness in distinguishing between chargeable and 
unchargeable fees, as well as the lack of effective notice to nonunion 
members as to what fees are being deducted and the justifications 
for their deductions. In sum, without saying it in so many words, 
Alito found that compulsory agency fees violate due process.
As long tradition, precedents, and academic discourse have re-
vealed, “procedural” due process has two prongs: to be legally valid, 
(1) a governmental action must accord with the “Law of the Land,”57 
and 2) its enforcement must comport with fair judicial procedures.58 
The first prong has expanded into the “Principle of Legality”. Laws 
that cannot be understood are void for vagueness. Laws that lack 
any rational connection between means and ends are “arbitrary” 
and invalid. Laws that lack any public purpose and are instituted 
merely to advance one group’s interest over another’s (taking from A 
and giving to B) are also void. And, of course, laws or governmental 
actions that do not come from a legitimate lawgiver lack authority 
(Law of the Land).59 
57 The Law of the Land is often, though not incontestably, associated with the Magna 
Carta. “No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or pos-
sessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, nor will we 
proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment 
of his equals or by the law of the land.” Magna Carta, § 39 (1215). 
58 The scholarly consensus is that its source is the Statute of Edward III, which de-
clared, “That no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land 
or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without 
being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.” Statute of 1354 (Edw. III). An-
other opinion holds that the principle of fair judicial process can be found, or is at least 
prefigured, in Section 39 of the Magna Carta or in Section 40: “To no one will we sell, 
to no one deny or delay right or justice.” 
59 The provenance of the principle of legality reaches back to many sources includ-
ing the Magna Carta, as well as the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. “Now laws 
are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common 
good—and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed 
the power of the lawgiver—and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the 
subjects, according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good.” 
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 96, art. 4.
Afamous more modern jurisprudential expositor was Lon Fuller. See Lon L. Fuller, 
The Morality of Law (1964). 
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First, concerning the principle of legality prong of procedural 
due process, Alito notes the essential arbitrariness in the distinc-
tion between chargeable and nonchargeable fees. The very list that 
the union made illustrates the problem. “Nonmembers were told 
that they had to pay for lobbying, social and recreational activities, 
advertising, membership meetings and conventions, and litigation, 
as well as other unspecified services that may ultimately inure to the 
benefit of the members of the local bargaining unit.”60 Each term is 
difficult to parse as either workplace related or political.
The Court found that the “line between chargeable and non-
chargeable union expenditures has proved to be impossible to draw 
with precision.”61 The Court had previously attempted to give that 
line some definition in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association,62 but de-
cades of litigation over the issue of lobbying expenses, for example, 
not only showed that the standard was “unworkable” (and not just for 
stare decisis purposes), but trenched into due process vagueness terri-
tory. In fact, AFSCME agreed at oral argument that the “chargeable–
non-chargeable line suffers from ‘a vagueness problem.’”63 
The second prong of procedural due process is the guarantee of 
fair adjudicative procedures. Its application has expanded greatly 
over the decades but the principle remains the same: lack of fair no-
tice and of access to effective remedies is a violation of due process. 
In Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,64 the Court directed unions to 
send an adequate notice as to the basis of the chargeable assessments 
so the nonunion members would have the ability to challenge the 
categorization. But the Court in Janus concluded that experience has 
taught that, not only have notices been inadequate, but nonunion 
members “face a daunting and expensive task if they wish to chal-
lenge union chargeability determinations.”65 
A much discussed example of the principle of legality is Justice Samuel Chase’s 
opinion in Calder v. Bull, and it may be significant that the examples he gives of invalid
laws were also prohibited by the positive law of the Constitution. 3 U.S. 386, 387–89 
(1798). 
60 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461 (cleaned up). 
61 Id. at 2481. 
62 500 U.S. 507 (1991). 
63 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481. 
64 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
65 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481. 
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The Court reproduced in the body of its opinion the notice of 
chargeable and nonchargeable fees that the union had made in this 
case:66 
Category Total Expense Chargeable Expense 
Salary and Benefits $14,718,708 $11,830,230 
Office Printing, Supplies, 
and Advertising 
$148,272 $127,959 
Postage and Freight $373,509 $268,107 
Telephone $214,820 $192,721 
Convention Expense $268,855 $268,855 
The Court then asked rhetorically how a nonunion member could 
ever determine what constitutes these categorizations and whether 
they were properly attributed without his incurring enormous ex-
pense in hiring lawyers and experts. It then noted that chargeability 
issues rarely surfaced at the court of appeals level simply because 
the nonunion members did not have the wherewithal to determine 
if they had a case.
The union answered that a nonunion member could still obtain 
justice through arbitration, which the union pays for, and he would 
not even have to attend the arbitration. But Alito pointed out that the 
nonunion member still has to pay for “attorneys and experts to mount 
a serious challenge.” He concludes that the union’s “suggestion that 
an objector could obtain adequate review without even showing up 
at an arbitration” is simply “farfetched.”67 In sum, under the Court’s 
analysis, the nonunion member lacks due process protections. 
IX. Originalism 
In what would seem to be an unnecessary aside, Alito took a di-
version in his opinion to answer an originalist argument that the 
union had put forward in its brief. Out of its 59 pages, the brief spent 
but three in proposing that the originalist understanding would not 
66 Id. at 2482.
 
67 Id.
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have accorded workplace speech any First Amendment protection.68 
But those three pages were enough to raise Alito’s ire.
That the proponents of maintaining the constitutionality of com-
pulsory agency fees would resort to an originalist argument—
however brief—is of crucial moment. It signals that even those who 
do not espouse originalism as a valid interpretive methodology be-
lieve themselves compelled to present it to the Court, many of whose 
members understand and utilize originalism. It is also of signifi-
cance that Kagan did not deal with her side’s originalist argument. 
One speculates that she held back because she thought the argument 
foolish, or futile, or, more likely, that she did not want to validate a 
method of interpretation that she opposes.
But Alito did think that the union’s argument was foolish; he 
wanted to show its futility; and he did want to validate an appropri-
ately rigorous method of originalism. It was as if he were saying to 
the respondents, “You want to make an originalist argument? Let me 
show you how it’s really done.” With raised eyebrows, Alito begins, 
“The most surprising of these new arguments is the Union respon-
dent’s originalist defense of Abood.”69 
First of all, he writes, if the union wants to make an originalist 
argument, then why does it emphasize stare decisis in its brief? Stare
decisis is not supposed to trump originalism. Further, if the union 
is correct that the Framers never intended the First Amendment to 
protect employee speech, then even Pickering’s limited support for 
employee speech on matters of public concern would fall. Why, 
then, does the union embrace Pickering so strongly in its brief? In 
fact, Alito scolds, the union wants us to apply “[t]he Constitution’s 
original meaning only when it suits them. . . . We will not engage 
in this halfway originalism.”70 He then punctures the union’s argu-
ment. First, any restrictions placed by the First Congress on gov-
ernment employees limited their outside business dealings, not 
their speech. Early restrictions on men in the military from using 
disrespectful words against the president are easily justified as a 
68 See Brief of Respondent American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, Council 31 [“AFSCME Brief”] at 17–20, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018) (No. 16-1466). 
69 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2469. 
70 Id. at 2470. 
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matter of military discipline. Lastly, the union relies on dictum from
a 20th-century case, Connick v. Myers, that “a public employee had no 
right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment,”71 
as if it bolstered its originalist argument. That case, Alito points out, 
is by definition separate from and an alternative to an originalist in-
terpretation. Alito leaves the union’s originalist argument in tatters, 
and Justice Kagan was wise not to touch it.
In fact, Alito argues, originalism points in the other direction. 
History shows that the Founders had no experience with unions 
or collective bargaining. But they knew about compelled speech. 
As a fundamental principle, the Framers rejected government co-
ercion to compel support for particular beliefs. To that end, Alito 
points to Thomas Jefferson’s attack on religious assessments in 
Virginia: “[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions for the propa-
gation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and 
tyrannical.”72 Unfortunately, Alito gives little more Founding-era 
evidence. It is a question, therefore, whether this one Jeffersonian 
swallow doth make for an originalist spring on compelled speech. 
Jefferson’s position on religious assessments has been tied to con-
tested notions of the original understanding of the Establishment 
Clause; it applied to one state only; and it may not have had evident 
parallels in the political realm.
More was needed it would seem, and Alito attempted to sup-
ply it in his opinion in Knox v. SEIU. There he put forward a series 
of closely related propositions, each supported by major Supreme 
Court precedents: 
1.	 “The First Amendment creates an open marketplace in 
which differing ideas about political, economic, and social 
issues can compete freely for public acceptance without im-
proper government interference.” 
2.	 “The government may not prohibit the dissemination of 
ideas that it disfavors, nor compel the endorsement of ideas 
that it approves.” 
71 Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) and citing AFSCME Brief 
at 2, 17). 
72 Id. at 2464 (citing A Bill for Establish Religious Freedom, in 2 Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson 545 (J. Boyd ed., 1950)). 
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3.	 “The First Amendment protects ‘the decision of both what 
to say and what not to say.’ And the ability of like-minded 
individuals to associate for the purpose of expressing com-
monly held views may not be curtailed.”73 
Taking those propositions together with his defense in Janus of the 
citizen’s right to search for truth based on his own freely informed 
conscience, we see that Alito treats the doctrine of compelled speech 
as the logical application of this moral axiom: Citizens in a represen-
tative republic possess rights of free inquiry in the search for truth, 
liberty to achieve association with fellow citizens, and protection 
and appropriate action from their government. This is, at bottom, a 
natural law proposition positivized in the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.74 That, we can say, is the originalism of Justice Alito.
Justice Clarence Thomas has the reputation of being the most 
rigorous originalist on the Court. One might think that if he found 
Alito’s analysis wanting, he would have appended a clarifying 
concurrence. But Thomas joined Alito’s opinions in Knox and Janus
without a separate concurrence. Nor did he himself make originalist 
argument for the protection of compelled speech in his opinion in 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, decided this 
term. We can conclude that Justice Thomas is in accord with Justice 
Alito’s originalist and philosophical principles on the doctrine of 
compelled speech. 
X. Weaponizing the Constitution 
Justice Kagan’s writing has sometimes been likened to Justice 
Scalia’s. Her dissent in Janus is well structured, uses economy of 
language, and is bitingly ironic. There is another parallel to Scalia. 
Although she does not possess the same panache, she attacks the 
majority as Scalia would when he thought the Court was striking off 
in an unjustified direction. She just espouses a different direction. 
What does Kagan fear? What does she think is really going on here?
She, of course, believes that Janus will cripple public-sector unions. 
Unions will lose “a secure source of financial support,” and with-
out adequate funding they will be a less effective representative of 
73 Knox v SEIU, 567 U.S. 298, 309 (2012).
 
74 See generally Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution (1990).
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workers. Nonunion workers do not lose out in an agency-fee regime, 
she claims. By law, the union must represent all workers. Without 
agency fees, free riders, being “economically rational actors,” will 
maintain benefits without having to bear the costs.75 Recent reports
of union finances and membership losses since Janus, though others 
observe that without the crutch of agency fees, public-sector unions 
will become more aggressive and effective in recruiting members.76 
Justice Alito pointed out that federal workers’ unions, which by
law cannot collect agency fees, are nonetheless very strong and enjoy
exclusive representation. Kagan rejoined that the free rider problem
in the federal workforce is, in fact, severe. Moreover, she noted that
wages and benefits are not the subject of union-management negotia-
tions in the federal sphere. Congress independently takes care of that.
(Alito had found that avoidance of free rides was not a compelling
interest sufficient to justify infringement of First Amendment rights.)
The decision, she pursues, “creates an unjustified hole in the law,
applicable to union fees alone,”77 for other forms of workplace speech
continue to be governed by Pickering. This decision is, in sum, simply
an anti-union diktat. Why did the Court overrule Abood? “[B]ecause it
wanted to.”78 But Justice Kagan fears that there is something else afoot. 
There is no sugarcoating today’s opinion. The majority 
overthrows a decision entrenched in this Nation’s law—and 
in its economic life—for over 40 years. As a result, it prevents 
the American people, acting through their state and local 
officials, from making important choices about workplace 
governance. And it does so by weaponizing the First 
Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the
future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy. 79 
And there you have her paradigm and her nightmare: The con-
servative court is readying a return to the years before 1938 when 
it used the Constitution to monitor and direct the economic policy 
75 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
76 Compare, e.g., Kris Maher, Unions Take a Hit after Court Ruling, Wall Street J., 
Aug. 6, 2018, at A3, with David Griesing, The Janus Ruling Doesn’t Have to Be a Death 
Knell for Public Unions, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 11, 2018, https://trib.in/Z+Pm8IP. 
77 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. at 2501. 
79 Id. 
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of the country. In the same way that the post-1938 Court—Justice 
Hugo Black most prominently—claimed that the Court had previ-
ously weaponized the Due Process Clause against economic reform 
and in favor of business, Kagan thinks this Court will use the First 
Amendment to the same end: 
[A]lmost all economic and regulatory policy affects or touches 
speech. So the majority’s road runs long. And at every stop 
are black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices. The First 
Amendment was meant for better things. It was meant not to 
undermine but to protect democratic governance—including 
over the role of public-sector unions.80 
In fact, Alito dropped a footnote that might have raised Kagan’s 
hackles even more. This, the most startling aspect to Alito’s opinion, 
is his re-opening the door of Lochner-era substantive due process. 
In the section of the opinion in which he tries to develop an origi-
nalist defense for the compelled speech doctrine, he wrote, “Indeed, 
under common law, ‘collective bargaining was unlawful,’81 . . . and 
into the 20th century, every individual employee had the ‘liberty of 
contract’ to ‘sell his labor upon such terms as he deem[ed] proper.’” 
At this point he cited Adair v. United States,82 one of the most promi-
nent cases upholding the substantive due process right of contract.
Although he tried to soothe—“We note this only to show the 
problems inherent in the Union respondent’s argument; we are not 
in any way questioning the foundations of modern labor law.”83— 
nonetheless, this may be one of the first times in the modern era 
that a justice writing a majority opinion has tied the substantive due 
process cases on liberty of contract to an originalist grounding.
But Kagan is heir, of course, to a line of cases in which the post-
New Deal Court weaponized the Constitution to insert policies into 
the Constitution that would have been unrecognizable to the Fram-
ers and even to most justices who served prior to 1960. That Court 
was also removing issues of public concern from the democratic pro-
cess altogether, as Justice Scalia time and again pointed out. In other 
80 Id. at 2502.
 
81 Id. at 2471 (majority op.) (citing Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990)).
 
82 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
 
83 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2471, n. 7.
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words, many originalists believe that the Court for decades has been 
weaponizing the Constitution in the culture wars, while heirs to the 
1938 Supreme Court believe that the modern Court is using the Con-
stitution as a weapon in an economic and class war. 
XI. The Future 
Despite Kagan’s “the sky is falling” fears of an end to democratic 
decisionmaking, Janus marks an affirmation of the democratic ethos. 
It does so in three ways. First, it affirms the fundamental nature of 
the human person in political society: a rational, associative, truth-
seeking individual with inalienable rights of conscience. Second, 
Janus is decided amidst a growing awareness that the decision-
making process in this republican polity is distorted by independent 
groups—factions, in Madison’s term—wielding power over govern-
mental agencies to make policies over citizens without the citizens’ 
consent. Third, Janus represents yet another chapter in the Roberts 
Court’s championing of First Amendment protection over the right 
to espouse different kinds of expressions and the right to the sanc-
tity of one’s own opinions. If Brett Kavanaugh is confirmed for the 
Supreme Court, we can expect more movement in all of those ways.
But against this sanguine hope, there is a tempering apprehension. 
One side of the Court claims that the other is making economic pol-
icy. The other side says that the Court has been creating new cultural 
norms. Many senators today vote on nominees based on predictions 
about what side of the policy battles a nominee will align himself.84 
It may not be too far distant when this country sees “resistance,” 
not only against particular federal office holders, against particular 
laws, or against particular election results, but against particular 
decisions of the Supreme Court. It is then that this country’s com-
mitment to the rule of law will be definitively tested. 
84 See generally Roger Pilon, Judicial Confirmations and the Rule of Law, Foreword, 
2016–2017 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. ix (2017). 
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